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“Everything is relative in this world, where change alone endures.”
1
-Leon Trotsky

I.

INTRODUCTION

Or so the saying goes. This may no longer be the case in a
narrow category of regulatory takings claims in Minnesota.
Although takings jurisprudence in the United States, especially
2
with regard to regulations, is notoriously enigmatic, the Minnesota
Supreme Court recently attempted to clarify the murky waters by
3
affirming the standard to be applied in airport zoning disputes in
4
DeCook v. Rochester International Airport Joint Zoning Board. In so
doing, however, it opened the door to a new inquiry into how
much economic impact a regulation must have on the market value
of a landowner’s property in order to be considered a taking.
This note begins by surveying important cases in federal and
5
Minnesota takings law that lay a foundation for DeCook. With that
background in mind, it discusses the facts and reasoning of the
6
7
court in DeCook and then analyzes the decision. It concludes by
arguing that the decision, while seeming to clear the muddle of
Minnesota regulatory takings jurisprudence by creating a brightline rule, undermines the apparent virtue of the rule for which it
advocates by shifting the inquiry in airport zoning takings cases
1. LEON TROTSKY, THE REVOLUTION BETRAYED 79 (Max Eastman trans., Dover
Publ’ns, Inc. 2004) (1937).
2. E.g., GEORGE SKOURAS, TAKINGS LAW AND THE SUPREME COURT 30 (1998)
(suggesting regulatory takings law is “incoherent and muddled”); Allison Dunham,
Griggs v. Allegheny County in Perspective: Thirty Years of Supreme Court Expropriation
Law, 1962 SUP. CT. REV. 63, 63 (1962) (calling takings law the “crazy-quilt pattern
of Supreme Court doctrine”); James E. Krier, The Takings-Puzzle Puzzle, 38 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1143, 1143 (1997) (“Regulatory takings are widely regarded as a
puzzle.”); William Michael Treanor, The Armstrong Principle, the Narratives of
Takings, and Compensation Statutes, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1151, 1151 (1997)
(noting that the Takings Clause “is famous for inspiring disagreement”).
3. See MINN. STAT. § 360.062(a) (2010) (codifying the existence of dangers to
lives and property of those in and around an airport); MINN. R. 8800.2400, subpt.
6(E)(1) (2011) (describing the interests airport safety zoning balances); DeCook
v. Rochester Int’l Airport Joint Zoning Bd., 796 N.W.2d 299, 307 n.5 (Minn. 2011)
(“Airport runway safety zoning is arguably sui generis . . . .”). See generally 1
DUNNELL MINN. DIGEST AERONAUTICS § 6.01 (5th ed. 2002) (discussing the policy
bases for airport zoning standards).
4. 796 N.W.2d. 299 (Minn. 2011).
5. See infra Part II.
6. See infra Part III.
7. See infra Part IV.
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from a balancing test to a debate about what constitutes a
“significant” amount of money without providing guidance as how
8
to analyze that question.
II. HISTORY
Because the language of the takings provision of the
9
10
11
Minnesota Constitution is similar to but somewhat broader than
12
the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, Minnesota takings
law is, to some extent, intertwined with federal takings law. It is
appropriate, therefore, to begin with federal law and cases
13
interpreting the Fifth Amendment before turning to Minnesota
takings law.
A. Federal Takings
1.

Constitutional Basis

The Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution protects
14
individuals from the exercise of eminent domain without
adequate compensation and has been read as “a tacit recognition
15
that the power to take private property exists.” Such a right has
16
been viewed as inherent in sovereignty. The protection of citizens
8. See infra Part V.
9. “Private property shall not be taken, destroyed or damaged for public use
without just compensation therefor, first paid or secured.” MINN. CONST. art. I, §
13; see also Floyd B. Olson, The Enigma of Regulatory Takings, 20 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 433, 437 (1994) (“The language ‘destroyed or damaged’ was not a part of the
original constitution . . . .”).
10. Wensmann Realty, Inc. v. City of Eagan, 734 N.W.2d 623, 631 (Minn.
2007).
11. Id. at 632 n.5 (citing State v. Strom, 493 N.W.2d 554, 558 (Minn. 1992)).
12. “[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.” U.S. CONST. amend. V.
13. For a survey of the major theoretical approaches to takings jurisprudence,
see SKOURAS, supra note 2, at 67–87.
14. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 601 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “eminent domain”
as “[t]he inherent power of a governmental entity to take privately owned
property, esp[ecially] land, and convert it to public use, subject to reasonable
compensation for the taking”).
15. JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 11.11 (4th
ed. 1991) (quoting United States v. Carmack, 329 U.S. 230, 241 (1946)).
16. NANCIE G. MARZULLA & ROGER J. MARZULLA, PROPERTY RIGHTS 3–4 (1997).
These authors explain that this is the reason why the power of eminent domain is
not explicitly listed in the Constitution. Id. at 4; see also SKOURAS, supra note 2, at
11 (tracing authority for the power of eminent domain back to the Roman period
but noting such authority is usually traced back to the Magna Carta).
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from this inherent power via the Fifth Amendment has been
interpreted as
prevent[ing] the public from loading upon one individual
more than his just share of the burdens of government,
and say[ing] that when he surrenders to the public
something more and different from that which is exacted
from other members of the public, a full and just
17
equivalent shall be returned to him.
The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause applies this
18
mandate to state governments.
The Supreme Court has classified takings claims into two
19
The
general categories: physical occupation and regulatory.
20
former occurs when the government physically occupies land.
Protection from this type of taking is understood as the original
21
meaning behind the clause. In the latter instance, landowners
argue that the use of their land has been so restricted as to
22
Although regulatory takings
constructively constitute a taking.
23
were not recognized until the late nineteenth century, this area of
17. Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 325 (1893).
18. DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW § 2.01 (5th ed. 2003); Edward J.
Sullivan & Kelly D. Connor, Making the Continent Safe for Investors—NAFTA and the
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, in CURRENT TRENDS AND PRACTICAL STRATEGIES
IN LAND USE LAW AND ZONING 47, 50 (Patricia E. Salkin ed., 2004).
19. 26 AM. JUR. 2D Eminent Domain §§ 10–11 (2011).
20. MANDELKER, supra note 18, § 2.02. “The modern significance of physical
occupation is that courts, while they sometimes do hold nontrespassory injuries
compensable, never deny compensation for a physical takeover.” Frank I.
Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundation of “Just
Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1184 (1967); see, e.g., Loretto v.
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 441 (1982) (upholding the
view that physical occupation of property constitutes a taking).
21. FRED BOSSELMAN ET AL., THE TAKING ISSUE 104 (1973) (“There is no
evidence that the founding fathers ever conceived that the taking clause could
establish any sort of restrictions on the power to regulate the use of land.”); see also
William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the
Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782, 792 (1995) (noting that early state case law
required compensation only for physical appropriation of property). For an
overview of the development of the takings clause through Pennsylvania Coal, see
id. at 798–803.
22. See MANDELKER, supra note 18, § 2.01.
23. Terri L. Lindfors, Note, Regulatory Takings and the Expansion of Burdens on
Common Citizens, 24 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 255, 261 (1998); see also Thomas A.
Hippler, Comment, Reexamining 100 Years of Supreme Court Regulatory Taking
Doctrine: The Principles of “Noxious Use,” “Average Reciprocity of Advantage,” and
“Bundle of Rights” from Mugler to Keystone Bituminous Coal, 14 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L.
REV. 653, 660 (1987) (stating that Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887), was the
“first comprehensive analysis” of regulatory takings law). In Mugler, the Supreme
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law has proven to be very contentious, as the discussion below
shows.
The exercise of eminent domain is closely tied to the police
24
power. The police power in this context allows state governments
“to regulate land use and personal property without incurring the
25
Drawing a line between
obligation of paying compensation.”
when government regulation is a permitted use of the police power
and when it enters into the realm of an unconstitutional taking is
difficult, however, resulting in a confusing morass of rules and
26
analyses. As one commentator noted, “The real bases for many of
these decisions may simply be an unarticulated sense of fairness or
justice that is shrouded in a cloud of paraphrased quotes from
27
unreconciled state and federal decisions.” With that in mind, this
note turns to examine how the Supreme Court has tried to analyze
Court held that a state statute which prohibited the sale or manufacture of alcohol
was not a taking of a brewery owner’s property because the legislation was made to
abate a public nuisance. Mugler, 123 U.S. at 675.
24. Arthur G. Boylan, Note, Losing Clarity in Loss of Access Cases: The Minnesota
Supreme Court’s Muddled Analysis in Dale Properties, LLC v. State, 29 WM. MITCHELL
L. REV. 695, 703 (2002). Generally, the police power is “[t]he inherent and
plenary power of a sovereign to make all laws necessary and proper to preserve the
public security, order, health, morality, and justice.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY,
supra note 14, at 1276. More specifically, it is “[a] state’s Tenth Amendment right,
subject to due-process and other limitations, to establish and enforce laws
protecting the public’s health, safety, and general welfare, or to delegate this right
to local governments.” Id. The police power is generally “employed to protect the
health, safety, and morals of the community in the form of such things as fire
regulations, garbage disposal control, and restrictions upon prostitution and
liquor. But it has never been thought that government authority under the police
power was limited to those narrow uses.” Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police
Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 36 n.6 (1964) (citations omitted); see also Dan Herber,
Comment, Surviving the View Through the Lochner Looking Glass: Tahoe-Sierra and
the Case for Upholding Development Moratoria, 86 MINN. L. REV. 913, 918–19 (2002)
(discussing the relationship between eminent domain and the state’s police
power).
25. Brian D. Lee, Note, Regulatory Takings Depriving All Economically Viable Use
of a Property Owner’s Land Require Just Compensation Unless the Government Can Identify
Common Law Nuisance or Property Principles Furthered by the Regulation—Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992), 23 SETON HALL L. REV.
1840, 1844 n.26 (1993). While the police power is technically possessed only by
the states, not the federal government, it is necessary to keep the concept of police
power in mind while discussing Supreme Court takings cases because the Court is
addressing the constitutionality of state actions. DANIEL R. MANDELKER ET AL.,
PLANNING AND CONTROL OF LAND DEVELOPMENT: CASES AND MATERIALS 74 (8th ed.
2011).
26. See Olson, supra note 9, at 450 (“[Court] efforts . . . have yielded only
profound confusion for practitioners.”).
27. Id.
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regulatory takings cases.
2.

Pennsylvania Coal

The foundational U.S. Supreme Court case analyzing
28
In
regulatory takings is Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.
Pennsylvania Coal, owners of a home in Pennsylvania brought an
action against the Pennsylvania Coal Company seeking to enjoin
29
the company from mining coal underneath their property. The
owners purchased the land from the coal company in 1878,
knowing that the deed sold only the surface rights of the land and
expressly reserved for the coal company the right to remove all coal
30
On May 27, 1921, the Pennsylvania legislature
beneath it.
adopted the Kohler Act, which forbade mining anthracite coal “in
such way as to cause the subsidence of, among other things, any
31
Although the Act made
structure used as human habitation.”
32
some exceptions, both parties in the suit agreed that it applied in
this instance and that it effectively “destroy[ed] previously existing
33
rights of property and contract.” The Court was asked to consider
whether this result of the Kohler Act was a permissible use of the
police power or whether it constituted a taking under the Fifth
34
Amendment.
The Court, in an oft-quoted opinion by Justice Holmes, held
35
While noting that
that the statute amounted to a taking.
“[g]overnment hardly could go on if to some extent values incident
to property could not be diminished without paying for every such
28. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
“Genealogists of . . . regulatory takings
jurisprudence have found their Adam” in this case. Robert Brauneis, The
Foundation of Our “Regulatory Takings” Jurisprudence: The Myth and Meaning of Justice
Holmes’s Opinion in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 106 YALE L.J. 613, 615 (1996);
see also WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS 13–27 (1995) (analyzing the
opinion and arguing that the Court’s ruling had little effect on relations between
coal companies and owners of surface rights); see also Hippler, supra note 23, at
656–80 (describing the theory of regulatory takings before Pennsylvania Coal). But
cf. Brauneis, supra, at 701 (arguing that Pennsylvania Coal’s foundational status in
regulatory takings jurisprudence stems from “erroneous genealogy”).
29. Pa. Coal Co., 260 U.S. at 412.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 412–13.
32. Id. at 413. Among the exceptions are instances where the same person
owns the surface and subsurface land and the coal is at least 150 feet away from
another’s property. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 412.
35. Id. at 414–15.
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36

change in the general law,” the Court nevertheless held that the
Act was not a valid exercise of the police power because the extent
37
of the public’s interest in the statute was limited and the personal
safety issues that subsidence mining created could be dealt with by
38
providing notice to the owners of surface rights. A regulation that
39
“goes too far” results in a taking because, although the Fifth
Amendment provides for the government to take private property
that is needed for public use, it ensures that compensation must be
40
The Court stated that a limited reading of the
made for it.
amendment is necessary because “the natural tendency of human
nature is to extend the qualification [of the police power] more
41
and more until at last private property disappears.” Exactly when
a regulation “goes too far,” however, and private property begins to
vanish is the million-dollar question. While Justice Holmes did not
provide a bright-line rule, he did suggest that the “extent of the
diminution” in value of the property is a factor in answering this
42
question and that “[w]hen [the diminution in value] reaches a
certain magnitude, in most if not all cases there must be an
43
exercise of eminent domain and compensation to sustain the act.”
The decision in Pennsylvania Coal was not unanimous. Justice
Brandeis dissented, arguing that the coal company’s mining of coal
so as to cause subsidence of the land amounted to a public
36. Id. at 413.
37. Id. at 413–14. “Holmes saw no qualitative difference between traditional
takings and traditional exercises of the police power, but only a continuum in
which established property interests were asked to yield more or less to the
pressures of public demands.” Sax, supra note 24, at 41.
38. Pa. Coal Co., 260 U.S. at 414. Further on in the opinion, Justice Holmes
addresses the safety issue again by differentiating between the case at bar and an
earlier case. Id. at 415. In Plymouth Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania, the Court held that a
legislative act requiring coal mining companies to leave a pillar of coal as a barrier
between their mine and the mine of another was constitutional. 232 U.S. 531, 544
(1914). The purpose behind the law was to ensure the safety of workers in an
adjacent mine if a neighboring mine should be abandoned and fill with water. Pa.
Coal Co., 260 U.S. at 415. This case was different, Holmes argued, because the
latter act “was a requirement for the safety of employees invited into the mine, and
secured an average reciprocity of advantage that has been recognized as a
justification of various laws.” Id.
39. Pa. Coal Co., 260 U.S. at 415. This standard has been described as “more
of an observation about the difficulty in deciding when compensation should be
paid than it is a rule capable of precise application.” Olson, supra note 9, at 434.
40. Pa. Coal Co., 260 U.S. at 415.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 413.
43. Id.
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nuisance, and the police power is a recognized means of
46
securing the abatement of such a nuisance, provided a public
47
interest is protected and the means for protecting that interest are
48
When addressing Justice Holmes’s extent of
“appropriate.”
diminution factor, Justice Brandeis argued that, should diminution
in value be used to determine whether a regulation goes too far,
the value of the taken property must be compared to the value of
49
Otherwise, every regulation could
the property as a whole.
amount to a taking simply by changing the whole from which the
44. Id. at 417 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
45. Id.
46. This understanding of the role of the police power in takings claims is an
expansion of a theory first set forth by Justice Harlan in Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S.
623 (1887). Sax, supra note 24, at 38–39; see also FISCHEL, supra note 28, at 61
(“The ‘nuisance exception’ may be a sensible rule, but it begs the question of who
is to decide what constitutes a nuisance.”); Lindfors, supra note 23, at 264
(discussing Mugler).
47. Pa. Coal Co., 260 U.S. at 418. A “restriction imposed to protect the public
health, safety or morals from dangers threatened is not a taking. The restriction
here in question is merely the prohibition of a noxious use.” Id. at 417.
48. Id. at 418. In addressing an exception in the statute for situations where
one person owns both the surface and subsurface of the land, Justice Brandeis
counters Justice Holmes’s argument by noting that such an exception is not
necessary because, “[w]here the surface and the coal belong to the same person,
self-interest would ordinarily prevent mining to such an extent as to cause a
subsidence.” Id. at 420. Cf. Joseph L. Sax, Takings, Private Property, and Public
Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149, 172 (1971) (arguing that competing claims of property
owners should be resolved by inquiring into what a single, rational owner of the
affected resources would do). A similar line of reasoning can be found in tort law
and is exemplified by Vincent v. Lake Erie Transportation Co., 109 Minn. 456, 124
N.W. 221 (Minn. 1910). There, the court imposed damages on a steamship owner
for damage sustained to a dock owned by another when the ship was tied fast to
the dock during a storm. Id. at 457–60, 124 N.W. at 221–22. “[T]he defendant
prudently and advisedly availed itself of the plaintiffs’ [dock] for the purpose of
preserving its own more valuable property [the steamship], and the plaintiffs are
entitled to compensation for the injury done.” Id. at 460, 124 N.W. at 222. Just as
a prudent owner of both ship and dock would allow damage to be done to the less
valuable item in order to preserve the more valuable one, so too the owner of the
land with a house built upon it and the subsurface rights beneath that house
would not mine in such a way as to cause the ground to subside unless the value of
the coal within the land were enough to outweigh the cost of repairs to make the
house inhabitable or the price of relocating.
49. Pa. Coal Co., 260 U.S at 419. “[W]e should compare [the value of the coal
kept in place by the restriction] with the value of all other parts of the land. That
is, with the value not of the coal alone, but with the value of the whole property.”
Id. Cf. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 130 (1978)
(“‘Taking’ jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete segments
and attempt to determine whether rights in a particular segment have been
entirely abrogated.”).
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50

part is derived. The quandary of deciding just what values should
be compared in determining extent of diminution in value of
51
property has been termed the “denominator problem” and
52
persists in regulatory takings cases to this day.
3.

Penn Central

While Pennsylvania Coal established a general rule, it provided
little instruction as to the application of that rule to subsequent
53
disputes. Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York
attempted to clarify the circumstances under which a regulation
“goes too far.” The Penn Central dispute centered on a proposed
54
addition of a multi-story office building above New York City’s
55
56
Grand Central Terminal, a building which had been designated
57
by the Landmarks Preservation Commission (Commission) as a
landmark whose modification required approval from the
58
59
Commission. The Commission refused to grant such approval,
60
and the owners of Grand Central Terminal filed suit. In a five61
three decision, the Court held that the Commission’s denial of
the proposal to develop the space above Grand Central Terminal
into an office building pursuant to the New York City Landmarks
62
63
Law did not constitute a taking.
In so ruling, the Court enumerated three factors to be used
when considering regulatory takings. A court must weigh (1) the
50. Pa. Coal Co., 260 U.S. at 419 (“The sum of the rights in the parts can not
[sic] be greater than the rights in the whole.”).
51. JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 1112 n. 28 (7th ed. 2010).
52. See infra Parts II.A.3 and III.
53. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
54. For an artist’s rendering of the proposed designs, see DUKEMINIER, supra
note 51, at 1117–18.
55. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 116.
56. Id. at 115–16.
57. For a general description of the law creating the Commission and the
process through which landmark designations are made and can be appealed, see
id. at 109–15.
58. Id. at 112.
59. Id. at 117.
60. Id. at 104, 119.
61. Justice Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Stevens,
penned a dissent that cited lack of an average reciprocity of advantage as a key
factor for disagreeing with the majority’s opinion that the law did not constitute a
taking in this circumstance. Id. at 140 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
62. See id. at 109–10 for a general description of the law.
63. Id. at 138.
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economic impact of the regulation on the landowner, (2) the
extent to which the regulation interferes with “distinct investment65
backed expectations,” and (3) the character of the government
66
action. The Court also noted that takings cases are “essentially ad
67
hoc, factual inquiries.” Because of the nature of the inquiry and
the factors described, this opinion has been criticized for leading to
68
inconsistent results because the multiplicity of factors to be
considered and then balanced in order to reach a conclusion
creates considerable variability.
B. Minnesota Takings
1.

Constitutional Basis
69

Minnesota’s state constitution includes a takings provision,
70
but it is broader than its federal counterpart, thereby giving
landowners additional protection. Likewise, the state’s statutory
definition of “taking” is also quite inclusive, encompassing “every
interference, under the power of eminent domain, with the

64. Id. at 124.
65. Id.
66. Id. “A ‘taking’ may more readily be found when the interference with
property can be characterized as a physical invasion by government . . . .” Id.
67. Id. Cf. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922) (“[Articulating
when a regulation goes too far] is a question of degree—and therefore cannot be
disposed of by general propositions.”).
68. Andrea L. Peterson, The Takings Clause: In Search of Underlying Principles
Part I—A Critique of Current Takings Clause Doctrine, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 1299, 1316
(1989). See id. at 1317–34 for a discussion of the four major takings tests
delineated by the Supreme Court. The Penn Central test is appropriate in most
instances. Boylan, supra note 24, at 701. But “[i]t is difficult to discern from the
Court’s takings decisions which test the Court would apply in any given case.”
Peterson, supra, at 1316.
69. See MINN. CONST. art. I, § 13.
70. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. Such an observation can also be made of
twenty-four other state constitutions. Allison J. Midden, Note, Taking of Access:
Minnesota Supreme Court Declines to Allow Admission of Evidence of Diminished Access
Due to Installation of a Median in a Takings Case, 25 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 329, 337
n.58 (1999); see, e.g., ARK. CONST. art. II, § 22 (“[P]rivate property shall not be
taken, appropriated or damaged for public use, without just compensation
therefor.”); MO. CONST. art. I, § 26 (“[P]rivate property shall not be taken or
damaged for public use without just compensation.”); TEX. CONST. art. I, § 17(a)
(“No person’s property shall be taken, damaged, or destroyed for or applied to
public use without adequate compensation being made . . . .”). The common law
provides similarly broadened provisions in the other twenty-six states. Boylan,
supra note 24, at 705 n.90.
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71

possession, enjoyment, or value of private property.” The purpose
of the Minnesota takings provision, however, is the same as that of
the Fifth Amendment: it “ensure[s] that the government cannot
force ‘some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all
72
fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.’”
Because much of Minnesota regulatory takings law is based on
reasoning adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court, it is similarly
73
74
confused, as is the proper place of the state’s police power.
2.

McShane

In certain instances, Minnesota employs rules other than the
Penn Central balancing test to determine whether a taking has
75
occurred. One of these is specific to airport zoning regulations
76
The
and was first articulated in McShane v. City of Faribault.
McShanes, owners of sixty-five acres of land near the Faribault
77
78
Municipal Airport, wanted to sell their land, which had been
79
used for agricultural purposes, to developers. Use of the land for
agriculture had been made impractical or impossible by the
trisection of the land by two highways, but the presence of the
highways had increased the land’s value for commercial
80
Shortly after the family had negotiated an
development.
agreement, which included an option to sell parcels of the land for
commercial development, an ordinance was enacted that severely
restricted the uses to which forty-two of the acres of land could be
81
Suit was brought after attempts to have the ordinance
put.
82
repealed failed.
The Minnesota Supreme Court held that the airport zoning

71. MINN. STAT. § 117.025, subdiv. 2 (2011).
72. Zeman v. City of Minneapolis, 552 N.W.2d 548, 552 (Minn. 1996)
(quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).
73. Boylan, supra note 24, at 707–08.
74. State ex rel. Lachtman v. Houghton, 134 Minn. 226, 230, 158 N.W. 1017,
1019 (1916) (admitting that the distinction between lawfully and unlawfully
imposed restrictions is considered by courts on a case-by-case basis).
75. For a survey of these tests, see Lindfors, supra note 23, at 273–77.
76. 292 N.W.2d 253 (Minn. 1980).
77. Id. at 255.
78. Id. at 256.
79. Id. at 255.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 255–56.
82. Id. at 256.
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83

ordinance did constitute a compensable taking. In so holding,
84
the court distinguished between regulations implemented for the
85
benefit of a government enterprise and those which are enacted
as part of a greater zoning scheme, so-called “‘arbitration’
86
It held that, when land use regulations are
regulations.”
implemented to benefit a specific governmental enterprise, such as
an airport, a taking has occurred when a landowner’s property has
suffered a “substantial and measurable decline in market value”
87
due to the regulations. Because the parties in this case agreed the
reduction was substantial, the court did not address an appropriate
88
means of determining what constitutes “substantial.”
83. Id. at 258–59.
84. Id. at 257 (citing Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926)
(holding that regulation of land use is not a taking unless it deprives the property
of all reasonable use)). The court also drew upon the work of Professor Sax in
determining that the maintenance of such a distinction was appropriate. Id. at
258 (citing Sax, supra note 24).
85. “Governmental enterprise” is “an enterprise undertaken by a
governmental body, such as a parks department that creates a public park.”
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 14, at 611; see infra Part II.B.3; see also Sax,
supra note 24, at 62 (providing a more comprehensive description of government
enterprise).
86. DeCook v. Rochester Int’l Airport Joint Zoning Bd., 796 N.W.2d 299, 306
(Minn. 2011) (citing McShane, 292 N.W.2d at 258); see also Sax, supra note 24, at
62–63 (providing a more comprehensive description of the arbitration function of
government). The appellants in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York
also argued that the Landmarks Law is an example of government acting in an
enterprise function, creating a compensable taking. 438 U.S. 104, 135 (1978).
The Court rejected this argument because the law “neither exploits appellants’
parcel for city purposes nor facilitates nor arises from any entrepreneurial
operations of the city.” Id.
87. McShane, 292 N.W.2d at 258–59.
88. Id. at 257. In its recitation of the facts, however, the court showed that
both parties came to such a conclusion by using percent diminution in value. Id.
at 256. By the plaintiffs’ expert, the property’s value had been reduced from
$522,000 to $360,000. Id. The defense contended that the value of one part of
the land had been reduced from $63,740 to $32,520, and the value of the other
part of the land had been reduced from $179,710 to $163,000. Id. In its opinion,
the court errs in its arithmetic in two of the three estimates. The opinion states
the diminution in value based on the plaintiffs’ expert’s estimation was 67%, but
dividing $360,000 by $522,000 yields 68.96% (or about 69%). Id. While the
opinion states that the defendant’s expert’s estimation of the diminution in value
of the first parcel was 50%, doing the math gives a result of 51.02% (or about
51%). Id. The court was correct in the diminution in value of the second parcel
of land by the defendant’s expert. While the differences in sums may seem
inconsequential, the failure of the court to check its math suggests a discomfort
working with numbers that could lead to decisions based more on a gut feeling of
how much diminution in value is too much rather than an analysis of what
percentage crosses the line.
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Although one of the remedies the McShanes requested from
the court was an order compelling the city to begin condemnation
89
proceedings, the Minnesota Supreme Court granted the city the
option either to repeal the ordinance or to condemn the
90
property.
3.

The Enterprise/Arbitration Distinction

A key component of the McShane decision was its insistence on
the maintenance of a distinction between enterprise and
arbitration regulations. In an oft-cited article, Professor Sax,
seemingly frustrated by the Supreme Court’s articulation of
91
multiple and conflicting theories on regulatory takings analysis,
92
enunciated a new definition of property from which a new takings
rule emerged:
[W]hen an individual or limited group in society sustains
a detriment to legally acquired existing economic values
as a consequence of government activity which enhances
the economic value of some governmental enterprise,
then the act is a taking, and compensation is
constitutionally required; but when the challenged act is
an improvement of the public condition through
resolution of conflict within the private sector of the
93
society, compensation is not constitutionally required.
The underlying questions courts should be asking, Professor Sax
suggested, are “to what kind of competition ought existing values
be exposed; and, from what kind of competition ought existing
94
values be protected.” When the government acts only to mediate
89. Id. at 255.
90. Id.
91. “It seems appropriate to inquire whether the currently available theories
are capable of resolving the problem of the taking cases.” Sax, supra note 24, at
46. For a survey of the theories that led Professor Sax to this conclusion, see id. at
46–60.
92. Professor Sax defined property as
a multitude of existing interests which are constantly interrelating with
each other, sometimes in ways that are mutually exclusive. . . . It is more
accurate to describe property as the value which each owner has left after
the inconsistencies between the two competing owners have been
resolved . . . . Property is thus the result of the process of competition.
Id. at 61.
93. Id. at 67. Professor Sax also noted two exceptions to the requirement for
compensation for governmental enterprise: occasions that provide either a
reciprocal benefit or an incidental benefit. Id. at 73–74.
94. Id. at 61.
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disputes among competing claimants of property, losses resulting
95
from such action are not compensable. When the government is
a participant in competition for resources and therefore acts in an
enterprise capacity, however, concerns over “arbitrary, unfair, or
96
tyrannical government” support requiring compensation.
When considering the rule in relation to the Penn Central
factors, Professor Sax’s formulation maintains that the character of
the government action is the sole defining factor in a regulatory
97
takings analysis; the economic impact of the regulation and the
property owner’s investment-backed expectations have no place.
The McShane standard slightly modifies Professor Sax’s rule by
creating a hierarchy from the Penn Central factors. A court first
98
looks at the character of the government action. If the regulation
99
A
was enacted in an arbitration capacity, there is no taking.
regulation resulting from a government’s enterprise function,
however, requires the court to ask a second question: what was the
100
economic impact of that regulation on the value of the property?
101
If
Under McShane, if it was significant, a taking has occurred.
not, however, despite the fact that the regulation came about as the
102
result of a governmental enterprise, there has not been a taking.
Like Professor Sax’s rule, the McShane analysis ignores investmentbacked expectations.
Interestingly, nine years before the McShane opinion was
103
Professor Sax wrote another piece in which he
announced,
admitted that the theoretical underpinnings of his relatively simple
rule based on the arbitration/enterprise distinction may be more
104
While the definition of
complex than he originally understood.
property for which he advocated in this earlier article remained
105
substantially similar, his subsequent approach yielded different
95. Id. at 62.
96. Id. at 64. For a discussion of these concerns, see id. at 64–67.
97. Id. at 63.
98. See McShane v. City of Fairbault, 292 N.W.2d 253, 258 (Minn. 1980).
99. Id. (citing Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104
(1978)).
100. See id. at 259.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. McShane cites Sax, supra note 24, which makes the arbitration/enterprise
distinction, but it does not make any mention of his subsequent 1971 article.
McShane, 292 N.W.2d at 258.
104. Sax, supra note 48, at 150 n.5.
105. Compare supra note 92 with the definition from Professor Sax’s
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106

results in certain circumstances.
Professor Sax created a new
107
To accommodate these
entity he termed “public rights.”
interests, which should be viewed as comparable to private citizens’
right to property, he suggested:
Any demand of a right to use property that has
108
spillover effects[ ] . . . may constitutionally be restrained,
however severe the economic loss on the property owner,
without any compensation being required; for each of the
competing interests that would be adversely affected by
such uses has, a priori, an equal right to be free of such
burdens.
. . . [A]ny uses of property that do not involve such
spillover effects are constitutionally entitled to
109
protection . . . .
The underlying purpose of this rule is to maintain a system of
property rights that “maximiz[es] . . . the output of the entire
resource base upon which competing claims of right are
dependent, rather than maint[aining] . . . the profitability of
110
individual parcels of property.”
subsequent article:
Property does not exist in isolation. Particular parcels are tied to one
another in complex ways, and property is more accurately described as
being inextricably part of a network of relationships that is neither
limited to, nor usefully defined by, the property boundaries with which
the legal system is accustomed to dealing.
Sax, supra note 48, at 152.
106. See infra notes 195–200 and accompanying text.
107. Sax, supra note 48, at 151. “Much of what was formerly deemed a taking is
better seen as an exercise of the police power in vindication of what shall be called
‘public rights.’” Id.
108. Professor Sax describes spillover effects as having one of three forms. Id.
at 161–62. The first occurs when the owner of one land uses her land in a way that
restricts the use of adjacent land, like coal mining that causes drainage into lowerlying land. Id. at 161. The second is use of a common to which other owners have
equal right. Id. The example Professor Sax used is dumping industrial water into
a stream that a downstream landowner uses as a water supply. Id. The third type
of spillover is use of a property that endangers “the health or well-being of others.”
Id. at 162.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 172. Put another way:
[T]he proper decision as to competing property uses which involve
spillover effects is that which a rational single owner would make if he
were responsible for the entire network of resources affected, and if the
distribution of gains and losses among the parcels of his total holding
were a matter of indifference to him.
Id. This argument to internalize the externalities of an act can be found in other
contexts. Cf. Howard Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV.
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While the court in McShane did not mention Professor Sax’s
modified view, it is not clear that doing so would have changed the
111
Because the facts of McShane are very
outcome of McShane.
similar to those of DeCook, if this reasoning is correct, the effect of
Professor Sax’s subsequent scholarship may also not have impacted
112
the DeCook case.
4.

Wensmann

Twenty-seven years after McShane, in Wensmann Realty, Inc. v.
113
City of Eagan, the Minnesota Supreme Court addressed whether a
city’s refusal to amend a comprehensive city plan to permit
114
residential development of a golf course constituted a taking.
Rahn Family LP (“Rahn”) purchased Carriage Hills Golf Course in
115
When the city
1996 and subsequently began operating it.
updated its comprehensive plan six years later, the land on which
116
the golf course sat was rezoned from “public facilities” to “parks.”
In 2003, Rahn agreed to sell the property to Wensmann Realty, Inc.
(“Wensmann”) for commercial development as residential housing,
contingent on the city reclassifying the property to permit such
117
Shortly after Wensmann’s application for an amendment to
use.
118
the city plan was denied in 2004, Wensmann entered into an
option agreement with Rahn to purchase the property. The
agreement required Wensmann to file suit against the city to grant
119
Wensmann did so,
the approvals necessary to rezone the land.
120
alleging an unconstitutional taking.
In its analysis of the case, the court applied the Penn Central
factors, reasoning that these were appropriate because the
appellant was not requesting that the court interpret the Minnesota
121
While
Constitution differently than the Federal Constitution.
issues of fact on the nature of the economic-impact factor
347, 348 (1967) (“A primary function of property rights is that of guiding
incentives to achieve a greater internalization of externalities.”).
111. See infra text accompanying notes 190–96.
112. See infra text accompanying notes 190–97.
113. 734 N.W.2d 623 (Minn. 2007).
114. Id. at 629.
115. Id. at 627.
116. Id. at 627–28.
117. Id. at 628.
118. Id. at 628–29.
119. Id. at 629.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 633.
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precluded the court from deciding the ultimate question, the
court did fully analyze the claim under Penn Central’s rubric and
123
The court held that,
thereby reached a number of conclusions.
in cases where the government chooses to maintain an existing
comprehensive plan, the appropriate standard to be used is
whether the regulation “leaves any reasonable, economically viable
124
The court also held that the investmentuse of the property.”
125
backed expectations factor weighed in favor of the city, while the
character of the governmental action factor favored the
126
developer.
Although buried in a footnote, the court’s observation that
“[w]e do not view the McShane analysis as different from or
inconsistent with the flexible approach to takings adopted by the
127
Supreme Court in Penn Central” would come to be a key point of
contention in the subsequent DeCook dispute over whether McShane
established a separate Minnesota standard for airport zoning
128
takings cases.
122. Id. at 637.
123. See supra notes 118–20.
124. Wensmann Realty, Inc., 734 N.W.2d at 635. In so doing, the court rejected
both the city’s means of measurement (percent diminution in value from before
and after the amendment of the comprehensive plan) and the developer’s
(comparison of the value of the property as a golf course to its value as a
residential development). Id. at 634. The court rejected the city’s measurement,
however, because it “is not well suited to measure the economic impact of the
government’s decision to maintain the status quo.” Id.
125. Id. at 638.
126. Id. at 640.
127. Id. at 640 n.14.
128. Compare Brief for Respondents at 9, DeCook v. Rochester Int’l Airport
Joint Zoning Bd., 796 N.W.2d 299 (Minn. 2011) (A09-969), 2009 WL 8187700, at
*12 (interpreting the footnote to mean that “even under Penn Central, one of the
three factors to be considered is the ‘character of the government action’”), with
Reply Brief for Appellant at 6, DeCook, 796 N.W.2d 299 (No. A09-969) (arguing
that the footnote shows that the Minnesota Supreme Court rejected the view that
McShane constituted a separate test). In the Wensmann footnote, the court pointed
to two sources which argue that McShane did articulate a separate standard.
Wensmann, 734 N.W.2d at 641 n.14 (citing 25 JAMES R. DORSEY ET AL., MINNESOTA
PRACTICE—REAL ESTATE LAW § 10.37 (Eileen M. Roberts ed., 2007) and Boylan,
supra note 24, at 708). In Wensmann, however, the court seemed more persuaded
by an argument enunciated in Pratt v. State Dep’t of Natural Res., 309 N.W.2d 767,
774 (Minn. 1981), that “the principles enunciated in McShane for determining
whether a taking has occurred must be applied with some flexibility.” Wensmann,
734 N.W.2d at 641 n.14 (citing Pratt, 309 N.W.2d at 774). It is important to note,
though, the factual circumstances of Pratt. There, the Crow Wing County District
Court interpreted a statute to declare certain waters public, even though those
waters had previously been held privately. Pratt, 309 N.W.2d at 769–70. The court
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Wensmann, with its application of the Penn Central factors, was
129
based upon modification of a comprehensive land plan, while
McShane dealt with the potential taking of land for a government
130
enterprise. The significance of the distinction and the ambiguity
of the footnote in Wensmann were not apparent until DeCook.
III. THE DECOOK DECISION
A. Background
In 1989, plaintiffs Leon and Judith DeCook made two
131
purchases, which resulted in their acquisition of 240 acres of land
132
The DeCooks first
north of the Rochester International Airport.
133
On December 22,
purchased 217 acres on July 11 for $120,000.
the DeCooks purchased an additional twenty-three acres for
134
$39,600, yielding a total purchase price for the entire property of
135
At the time of purchase, nineteen acres of the
$159,600.
property were subject to the most restrictive class of land use
136
regulations known as Safety Zone A. Safety Zone A restricted the
then had to determine whether the government acted in an enterprise or
arbitration capacity when it prohibited the use of mechanical harvesting devices
on public waters. Id. at 773–74. It noted, “[McShane] presented the situation in
which the governmental enterprise function of a regulation was not just
predominant but exclusive.” Id. at 774. A plausible reading of the comment
noted by the Wensmann court is that such flexibility was necessary in Pratt because
the scenario did not fall neatly into either the arbitration or enterprise function.
See Wensmann, 734 N.W.2d at 641 n.14.
129. Wensmann, 734 N.W.2d at 632–33.
130. McShane v. City of Faribault, 292 N.W.2d 253, 258 (Minn. 1980).
131. Defendant’s Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment
at 3, DeCook v. Rochester Int’l Airport Joint Zoning Bd., 2009 WL 1513328 (D.
Minn. Feb. 27, 2009) (No. 55-CV-06-3803), 2006 WL 6287378 [hereinafter
Defendant’s Summary Judgment Motion].
132. DeCook v. Rochester Int’l Airport Joint Zoning Bd., 796 N.W.2d 299, 302
(Minn. 2011).
133. Defendant’s Summary Judgment Motion, supra note 131, at 3. The
DeCooks purchased this land from Joseph and Shirley More. Id. This purchase
included the eighty acres that would become the center of the dispute. Id.
134. Id. This land was purchased from the Sportsmen’s Recreation Club. Id.
135. DeCook, 796 N.W.2d at 302; Defendant’s Summary Judgment Motion,
supra note 131, at 3.
136. DeCook, 796 N.W.2d at 302; see MINN. R. 8800.2400, subpt. 5 (2009)
(creating three safety zones around an airport). Safety Zone A applies to the
approach zone of a runway and “extends outward from the end of the primary
surface a distance equal to two-thirds the runway length.” Id. Safety Zone B
“extends outward from safety zone A a distance equal to one-third the runway
length,” and Safety Zone C encompasses “all that land which is enclosed within the
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use of land within the zone to agricultural or certain commercial
and industrial uses, such as outdoor recreation, parking lots, and
137
cemeteries, and the DeCooks were aware of this restriction when
138
From the time of purchase, the DeCooks
they bought the land.
139
lived on the property and rented 217 acres of it for farming.
They began developing the eastern eighty acres of the property
140
into a golf course in 1990 and opened Oak Summit Golf Course,
141
142
Since
an eighteen-hole public golf course, on June 20, 1992.
opening the golf course, the DeCooks have expanded it onto
143
approximately 160 acres and continue to own and operate it.
Defendant Rochester International Airport Joint Zoning
144
Board (Board) enacted further restrictions on land surrounding
145
The ordinance was
the airport in 2002 via Ordinance No. 4.
instituted in furtherance of the airport’s master plan to allow a
146
Such
runway to be used as a precision instrument runway.
runways are advantageous because they make it safer for airplanes
to land during adverse weather conditions where visibility is
perimeter of the horizontal zone . . . and which is not included in zone A or zone
B.” Id.
137. DeCook, 796 N.W.2d at 302. While the constraints on land in Zone A are
quite restrictive, some uses of the land are permitted:
Zone A shall contain no buildings, temporary structures, exposed
transmission lines, or other similar land use structural hazards, and shall
be restricted to those uses which will not create, attract, or bring together
an assembly of persons thereon. Permitted uses may include, but are not
limited to, such uses as agriculture (seasonal crops), horticulture, raising
of livestock, animal husbandry, wildlife habitat, light outdoor recreation
(nonspectator), cemeteries, and auto parking.
MINN. R. 8800.2400, subpt. 6(B).
138. DeCook v. Rochester Int’l Airport Joint Zoning Bd., No. A09-969, 2010
Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS 419, at *1–2 (Minn. Ct. App. May 11, 2010), aff’d, 796
N.W.2d 299 (Minn. 2011).
139. Brief for Appellants at 3, DeCook, 2010 Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS 419
(No. A09-969) [hereinafter Appellants’ Appeals Brief].
140. Id.
141. OAK SUMMIT GOLF COURSE, http://oaksummitgolf.com (last visited Sept.
20, 2011). The course offers league play, golf instruction, and tournaments. Id.
142. Appellants’ Appeals Brief, supra note 139, at 3; see also DeCook, 796 N.W.2d
at 302.
143. Appellants’ Appeals Brief, supra note 139, at 3.
144. The Board was created pursuant to MINN. STAT. § 360.063 (2011).
Complaint ¶ II, DeCook, 796 N.W.2d 299 (No. 55-CV-06-3803). The statute grants
the Board authority to “adopt and enforce airport zoning regulations.” MINN.
STAT. § 360.063, subdiv. 3(a)(1). The Board also has the authority to administer
these regulations. Id. at subdiv. 3(b).
145. DeCook, 796 N.W.2d at 302.
146. Defendant’s Summary Judgment Motion, supra note 131, at 7.
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147

limited, but Minnesota law required them to maintain a wider
148
This ordinance further restricted the uses
approach zone.
149
150
allowed in, and increased the size of, Safety Zone A from what
the previous ordinance required.
After the enactment of
Ordinance No. 4, twenty-eight additional acres of the DeCooks’
151
property were classified as Safety Zone A.
B. District Court
The DeCooks commenced an inverse condemnation action
against the Board in 2005, alleging that the ordinance had
“substantially and materially reduced the owner’s legal ability to
152
develop” the land and created a “substantial and measurable
153
decline” in the market value of their property for the benefit of a
154
In their complaint, the DeCooks
governmental enterprise.
asserted that the changes brought about by Ordinance No. 4 had
155
decreased the market value of the property by at least $460,000.
In addition to denying that the zoning ordinance reduced either
the DeCooks’ ability to develop the property or the property’s fair
156
market value, the Board also argued, inter alia, that the takings
157
claim was premature. The Board moved for summary judgment,
147. Id.
148. Id. MINN. R. 8800.2400, subpt. 3(E) (2011) sets out the definition of a
precision instrument approach zone, and MINN. R. 8800.1200, subpt. 5(E) (2011)
requires:
The precision instrument approach surface inclines upward and outward
for a horizontal distance of 10,000 feet at a slope of 50:1, expanding
uniformly to a width of 4,000 feet, then continues upward and outward
for an additional horizontal distance of 40,000 feet at a slope of 40:1,
expanding uniformly to an ultimate width of 16,000 feet.
By contrast, the approach surface for non-precision instrument approaches is
much smaller. MINN. R. 8800.1200, subpt. 5(D).
149. DeCook, 796 N.W.2d at 302.
150. Id. at 303.
151. Id.
152. Complaint, supra note 144, ¶ VI.
153. Id. ¶ VIII.
154. Id.
155. Id. ¶ X.
156. Defendant’s Answer ¶ 6, DeCook, 796 N.W.2d 299 (No. 55-CV-06-3803),
2006 WL 6287380.
157. Id. ¶ 10. In its motion for summary judgment, the Board explains this
position by pointing to case law holding that inverse condemnation actions
alleging regulatory takings are not yet ripe if the landowner has not submitted a
development plan for the property. Defendant’s Summary Judgment Motion,
supra note 131, at 17 (citing Thompson v. City of Red Wing, 455 N.W.2d 512, 516
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159

which was granted, and the DeCooks appealed.
The Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the
160
holding that whether a diminution in value had
decision,
occurred and the extent of such diminution were questions of fact.
The court further held that whether a diminution is substantial is a
161
The Minnesota Supreme Court denied the
question of law.
162
Board’s petition for review.
On remand, the jury returned a special verdict in November
2008, establishing the diminution in value of the DeCooks’
163
Applying the Penn Central factors per the
property as $170,000.
164
Wensmann decision, the district court found that either a 3.5% or
165
166
6.14% diminution in value did not constitute a taking.
(Minn. Ct. App. 1990)). The DeCooks had not done so. Id. at 18. Because this
argument is not addressed in any appellate opinion, it seems likely that
subsequent courts agreed with the response enunciated by the DeCooks: that they
need not exhaust their administrative remedies before entering the courts because
they wished to sell the property to another to develop, not to develop it
themselves. Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion
for Summary Judgment at 11–12, DeCook, 796 N.W.2d 299 (No. 55-CV-06-3803),
2006 WL 6287379 (citing McShane v. City of Faribault, 292 N.W.2d 253, 256
(Minn. 1980)). The DeCooks also argued that, even if a variance to build on the
property had been applied for, Minnesota law would prevent the Board from
granting that variance. Id. at 12 (stating that the zoning ordinance prohibits a
zoning board from granting a variance for any use of the property which is not
permitted by the ordinance for property in the zone where the land is located
(citing MINN. STAT. § 462.357, subdiv. 6(2) (2010))).
158. DeCook, 796 N.W.2d at 303.
159. Id.
160. DeCook v. Rochester Int’l Airport Joint Zoning Bd., No. A06-2170, 2007
Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS 773, at *13 (Minn. Ct. App. July 31, 2007). In so
doing, the court applied the plaintiffs’ argument that McShane was still good law.
Id. at *7–8. It also points out that the Minnesota Court of Appeals is “‘not in [a]
position to overturn established supreme court precedent.’” Id. at *8 (quoting
State v. Ward, 580 N.W.2d 67, 74 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998)).
161. Id. at *11 (citing Keenan v. Int’l Falls—Koochiching Cnty. Airport Zoning
Bd., 357 N.W.2d 397, 400 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984)).
162. Appellants’ Appeals Brief, supra note 139, at 2.
163. DeCook, 796 N.W.2d at 304. The Board’s appraiser set the diminution at
$110,000, while the DeCooks’ appraiser set the diminution at $425,000. Id. It is
unclear how the jury reached its verdict of $170,000, but it could reflect the
inherent difficulty in determining the value of land and, correspondingly, the
challenge of ascertaining how much economic loss has resulted because of a
regulation. “Appraisal is as much an art as a science.” Interview with Howard
Roston, Partner, Malkerson Gunn Martin, in Minneapolis, Minn. (Aug. 17, 2011).
164. DeCook, 796 N.W.2d at 304 (taking $170,000 as a percentage of the
Board’s appraiser’s value).
165. Id. (taking $170,000 as a percentage of the DeCooks’ appraiser’s value);
see also infra note 185.
166. Or, to put it another way, the DeCooks’ property retained 93.86% (using
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C. Court of Appeals
The DeCooks appealed, arguing that McShane, not Penn
167
Central, controlled the analysis of the issue and that, under either
the McShane or Penn Central rules, the $170,000 reduction in value
168
was enough to constitute a taking. While the Minnesota Court of
Appeals agreed with the Board’s argument that McShane did not
provide “a separate and independent legal test for regulatory
169
and that Penn Central did govern the analysis of
takings,”
regulatory takings claims, it nevertheless reversed the district
court’s decision that the diminution in value did not constitute a
170
taking. The majority held that, even though the DeCooks realize
a benefit as well as a burden from the proximity of their property to
the airport, they “unequally bear the additional burden of use
171
restrictions,” resulting in a diminution of the property’s value
172
Requiring the DeCooks to
“with no commensurate benefit.”
173
sustain such a burden would be “manifestly unfair.”
174
In
Judge Matthew Johnson dissented from the opinion.
addition to taking issue with the majority’s failure to use “a
recognized method of measuring the economic impact of the

the Board’s pre-ordinance appraisal) or 96.5% (using the DeCooks’ pre-ordinance
appraisal) of its value even after the enactment of the ordinance.
167. Appellants’ Appeals Brief, supra note 139, at 6–10. The DeCooks point to
the fact that, even though the McShane decision discusses Penn Central, the
Minnesota Supreme Court explicitly adopted a different standard for enterprise
zoning regulations. Id. at 8–9. They also point to the broader language of the
Minnesota Constitution as a basis for asserting that they need not meet the higher
“taken” standard of the Federal Constitution because their claim arises under the
Minnesota Constitution and its broader language. Id. at 10.
168. Id. at 11–12. They do so by invoking the definition of “substantial” in the
sixth edition of Black’s Law Dictionary: “[O]f real worth and importance, of
considerable value and valuable.” Id. at 11 (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1428
(6th ed. 1991)). As the Board notes, this definition has been replaced in the
dictionary’s most recent incarnation by defining substantial only “in the context of
some defining legal test or concept.” Reply Brief for Appellant, supra note 128, at
4–5 (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 14, at 1565–66).
169. DeCook v. Rochester Int’l Airport Joint Zoning Bd., No. A09-969, 2010
Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS 419, at *10 (Minn. Ct. App. May 11, 2010) (citing
Wensmann Realty, Inc. v. City of Eagan, 734 N.W.2d 623, 641 n.14 (Minn. 2007),
aff’d, 796 N.W.2d 299 (Minn. 2011)).
170. Id. at *14.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at *14–19 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
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175

alleged regulatory takings,” Judge Johnson also argued that the
percent diminution in value of the property at issue did not rise to
176
He noted, “I am unable to find any
the level of a taking.
regulatory takings cases in Minnesota caselaw or federal caselaw in
which a property owner was successful with a diminution in value
177
that is remotely close to the diminution in this case,” pointing
also to cases where the Minnesota Supreme Court rejected
regulatory takings claims on properties whose value was diminished
178
179
As such, “there is no precedent for the
by 75% and 92.5%.
principle that a diminution in value of only six percent is enough
to allow the conclusion that a compensable regulatory taking has
180
occurred.”
D. Minnesota Supreme Court
After granting review, the Minnesota Supreme Court
determined that, in actions for a taking under the Minnesota
Constitution where relief was based on airport zoning restrictions,
181
While noting that the Minnesota
the McShane rule applies.
Supreme Court has applied the Penn Central analysis in
determining
regulatory
takings
under
the
Minnesota
182
Constitution, the court declined to do so in this instance because
McShane drew a distinction between enterprise and arbitration
183
regulations. While McShane did not expressly establish a separate
standard for airport zoning regulation takings claims, “a review of
the McShane briefs to [the Minnesota Supreme Court], and the
precedent upon which [the justices] relied, make clear that the
McShane test applies when relief is sought under the Minnesota
175. Id. at *15.
176. Id. at *18. But see infra note 179.
177. DeCook, 2010 Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS 419, at *17–18.
178. Id. at *18 (citing Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 384
(1926)).
179. Id. (citing Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 405 (1915)). While both
of these decisions were made before both Pennsylvania Coal and Penn Central, the
Supreme Court has subsequently cited both cases approvingly. Id. at *16 (citing
Concrete Pipe & Prods., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust, 508 U.S. 602, 645
(1993)).
180. Id. at *18–19.
181. DeCook v. Rochester Int’l Airport Joint Zoning Bd., 796 N.W.2d 299, 307
(Minn. 2011).
182. Id. at 305.
183. Id. at 306 (citing McShane v. City of Faribault, 292 N.W.2d 253, 257–58
(Minn. 1980)).
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184

Constitution in airport zoning cases.”
Additionally, the court applied McShane and held that a taking
185
had occurred because the diminution in value was substantial.
The court was persuaded by the plaintiffs’ argument that, by
186
common sense and dictionary definition, $170,000 is substantial.
To bolster this assertion, the court also pointed to a comparison of
the diminution in value to the purchase price of the property in
187
1989.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE DECOOK DECISION
The court’s adoption of the McShane rule over a Penn Central
analysis in airport zoning takings claims arising under the
Minnesota Constitution seems to create a bright-line rule that does
away with a criticism leveled at the Penn Central factors: inconsistent
188
But in rejecting the Penn Central factors in favor of
results.
McShane, the court has both lowered the standard and simply
rephrased the question. The key issue now is whether a diminution
in value of property as the result of such a regulation is
189
“substantial.” Unfortunately, the court provides little insight into
190
what this means, generating further uncertainty and reinforcing
the ad hoc nature of takings claims.
A. A Special Rule for Airport Zoning Regulatory Takings
The McShane rule appears to set a lower standard for
landowners by recognizing regulations that adversely affect their
184. Id. at 307.
185. Id. at 308–09. It is worth noting that, while the court is not persuaded by
the Board’s diminution in value argument, the figure it includes in the opinion is
incorrect. The opinion cites one measure that set the percent diminution in value
at 6.4% using the pre-regulation value of the DeCooks’ property against the
$170,000 jury verdict. Id. This is incorrect. The DeCooks estimated the predamage value at $4.8 million. Id. at 304. Dividing $4.8 million by $170,000 gives
6.14%, not 6.4%. Because the court correctly notes the value earlier in the
opinion in its summary of the district court’s decision, it seems likely that this is a
typographical error. Id. at 304. It is surprising, though, considering that a similar
mathematical error was made, and subsequently not corrected by the DeCook
decision, in McShane. See supra note 88.
186. DeCook, 796 N.W.2d at 308.
187. Id. The $170,000 jury award exceeds the $159,600 purchase price by
$10,400.
188. See supra text accompanying note 68.
189. DeCook, 796 N.W.2d at 304.
190. Id. at 308.
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191

property as takings. This is a boon to landowners, who now have
a lower threshold to meet, and a potential liability for regulators.
While DeCook made the McShane rule the law of the state, it remains
to be seen whether carving out a separate standard for such a
narrow segment of takings claims is advisable.
One potential problem with maintaining this special rule for
airport zoning regulation takings claims is that it is based upon a
theory of takings analysis that has been significantly altered by its
192
Such an action should give pause when a theory’s
creator.
staunchest advocate turns to understand the problem in a different
193
and more complex way. This quibble may be irrelevant, however,
because it is unclear whether a different outcome would result in
DeCook by applying the modification of the rule advocated in
194
Professor Sax’s subsequent article.
In Takings, Private Property, and Public Rights, Professor Sax
applied his spillover rule to three variations of an airport zoning
195
In two of the cases, the first where a landowner wants
dispute.
“to build a tall structure that interferes with flights to and from the
196
airport,” and the second where a landowner wants to live in an
197
area that may be disturbed by airport noise, no compensation
198
A third variation, however, that of a farmer
would be required.
wanting to farm a tract of land the airport would like to use for a
199
200
The DeCook case shares
runway, does merit compensation.
similarities with scenario one in that airspace above the land, a
201
common, is part of the dispute. But unlike the first scenario, the
191. Accord Interview with Bradley Gunn, Partner, Malkerson Gunn Martin, in
Minneapolis, Minn. (Aug. 17, 2011) (reading DeCook as adopting a lower threshold
than Penn Central because the DeCook rule only addresses the economic impact of a
regulation, ignoring investment-backed expectations and the character of the
governmental action). Contra Boylan, supra note 24, at 708 (referring to the
McShane standard as a “heightened” one).
192. See supra Part II.B.3.
193. See Sax, supra note 48, at 150 n.5.
194. Id. at 164.
195. Id. at 164–65.
196. Id. at 164.
197. Id.
198. Id. Compensation would not be required in the former case because the
claim involves a decision over the use of a “common, the ambient air, to which
both air travellers and landowners below a priori have an equal right of use.” Id.
In the latter case, there would again be no compensation because the conflict
could be resolved in either direction. Id. at 164–65.
199. Id. at 164.
200. Id. at 165.
201. The existence of a common “ought to be decided by a determination of
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regulation seeks not to control merely the airspace but also the
ground beneath it. In this way, it is more like the third scenario.
Even under Professor Sax’s modified rule, if a judge were to view
the DeCook scenario as more closely analogous to the third than the
first example, compensation would be required.
Additionally, the creation of a rule for such a small segment of
takings cases risks creating even more categories to which different
standards could apply. It is perhaps likely that the Minnesota
Supreme Court will extend McShane to cover other enterprise
regulations, thereby eliminating the problem of creating many
rules with a very narrow focus. Nevertheless, the specter of
202
waters of regulatory
completely sullying the already-muddy
takings law still remains because, whether or not the court decides
to extend McShane or to create more categories with special rules,
discussion must focus on where to place the boundaries of these
203
categories. As has been seen in earlier cases, trying to decide
where the borders are between categories can be just as intractable
as resolving takings decisions under other rubrics. All the
affirmation of the McShane standard has done is rephrase the
question without solving the problem.
A virtue of the McShane rule is that, because it appears to
create a bright-line test over a multi-factor balancing test like Penn
204
Central’s, the rule should be easier to apply and therefore cause
less uncertainty for potential litigants. If there has been a
significant economic impact on a claimant’s property, the
government must compensate the landowner or repeal the
ordinance that caused the reduction. If the economic impact is not
substantial, however, the regulation is not a taking, and no
compensation is necessary.
The seeming merit of this
straightforward test, however, is undercut by the court’s lack of
instruction as to what constitutes the key component of the rule:
“substantial.”
whether a resource such as the ambient air is inextricably intertwined with the use
of various properties.” Id. at 164.
202. SKOURAS, supra note 2, at 30.
203. See Pratt v. State Dep’t of Natural Res., 309 N.W.2d 767, 773–74 (Minn.
1981), where the court had difficulty determining whether the regulation served
an enterprise or an arbitration function.
204. This seems to abandon the motto of many previous takings cases,
however, which emphasized the fact-specific nature of each particular inquiry.
E.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978);
Wensmann Realty, Inc. v. City of Eagan, 734 N.W.2d 623, 632 (Minn. 2007) (citing
Westling v. Cnty. of Mille Lacs, 581 N.W.2d 815, 823 (Minn. 1998)).
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B. What Is “Substantial”?
After deciding that the McShane rule does constitute a separate
test for airport zoning regulation takings claims, the court gives two
reasons for finding a substantial diminution in value of the
205
DeCooks’ property: $170,000 is substantial by any definition and
the damages awarded by the jury exceed the DeCooks’ 1989
206
purchase price. Both are problematic.
The major problem with the court’s rule is that it does not
provide a yardstick for measuring “substantial.” While most
Americans, this author included, would agree that $170,000 is a
207
significant amount of money, surely such a value cannot be
208
When compared to the
considered substantial in all contexts.
209
millions that many companies expend to run their businesses, or
210
even the annual income of some Americans, such a sum, while
211
nothing to scoff at, amounts to a small accounting error.
Conversely, smaller sums of money which, relative to $170,000, may
205. DeCook v. Rochester Int’l Airport Joint Zoning Bd., 796 N.W.2d 299, 308
(Minn. 2011).
206. Id.
207. When comparing his salary to the jury award, Justice Paul Anderson
remarked, “I make $145,000, so $170,000 seems like a fair amount of money to
me.” Oral Argument at 1:47, DeCook, 796 N.W.2d 299 (No. A09-969), available at
http://www.tpt.org/courts/MNJudicialBranchvideo_NEW.php?number=A090969.
Accord Stuart Alger, $170,000 Is Still a Lot of Money, the Minnesota Supreme Court Says,
COM. REAL EST. TRENDS (May 10, 2010), http://cretrends.com/170000-is-still-a-lotof-money-the-minnesota-supreme-court-says.
208. See Reply Brief for Appellant, supra note 128, at 5 (noting that without
considering diminution in value, “courts have no principled method for weighing
the legal consequence of the number”); see also supra text accompanying notes 49–
52. Cf. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 419 (1922) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(“[V]alues are relative.”).
209. For example, Target spent $45.7 billion for cost of sales in 2010, with net
earnings of $2.9 billion. TARGET CORP., 2010 ANNUAL REPORT 18 (2010), available
at http://sites.target.com/images/company/annual_report_2010/documents
/Target_AnnualReport_2010.pdf.
210. In 2010, the average per capita income in Minnesota was $42,843. State
Annual Personal Income, BUREAU OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (Mar. 2011),
http://www.bea.gov/regional/spi/ (select “summary” under “step 1”; then select
“per capita personal income” and “2010” under “step 2”; then follow “display”
hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 14, 2011). By contrast, media mogul Oprah Winfrey
raked in $290 million in the same year, and pop star Lady Gaga took home $90
million. Dorothy Pomerantz, Lady Gaga Tops Celebrity 100 List, FORBES.COM (May
18, 2011, 10:00 AM), http://forbes.com/2011/05/16/lady-gaga-tops-celebrity-10011.html.
211. $170,000 represents 0.00037% of Target’s 2010 cost of sales but nearly
397% of the average Minnesotan’s annual income.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2011

27

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 1 [2011], Art. 1

554

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:1

not be incredibly large, may still be substantial relative to the
overall value of the property. Would an airport zoning ordinance
which reduces the market value of a $50,000 property to $25,000 be
212
DeCook does not say.
substantial enough to constitute a taking?
The rule that emerges from the court’s reasoning in this regard is
analogous to Justice Stewart’s famous line about pornography: “I
213
While such a statement makes for good
know it when I see it.”
rhetoric, it does little to elucidate the law.
Additionally, it is puzzling that the Board’s calculation of the
214
DeCooks’ loss based on percent diminution in value was rejected
in favor of a set dollar value, especially since the McShane court
points to the percent diminution in value as the means of
215
measuring damages in that instance. The DeCook court’s decision
does away with Justice Brandeis’s denominator problem by tossing
216
the numerator out with the denominator.
Moving the numbers from a takings scenario to a contract
dispute further illustrates the difficulty of this holding.
A
subcontractor who agreed to provide $100,000 worth of services
would be laughed out of court if he were to provide only $6,140
worth of those services and then demand payment on the contract,
minus damages for breach, because he had substantially
217
performed. Yet the same percentage in an airport zoning takings
212. What about a $15,000 reduction in the value of a property valued at
$20,000 before implementation of the regulation? Under a percent diminution
test, an ordinance causing a seventy-five percent reduction would very likely
constitute a taking. But $15,000 is less than ten percent of $170,000. Is that
enough to be “substantial?” Or is the dollar value of the loss only relevant when
the percent diminution in value really is de minimis, giving affected property
owners a second bite at the apple through DeCook?
213. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
214. DeCook v. Rochester Int’l Airport Joint Zoning Bd., 796 N.W.2d 299, 308
(Minn. 2011).
215. McShane v. City of Faribault, 292 N.W.2d 253, 258–59 (Minn. 1980).
216. The court did leave open the possibility of using percent diminution in
value in some instances, reasoning that “in some other regulatory takings dispute,
arithmetic calculations such as those urged by the Board will be persuasive.”
DeCook, 796 N.W.2d at 308. The court provides no insight, however, into the
situations where such a rule would be appropriate. See infra text accompanying
notes 225–26.
217. See CHRISTINA L. KUNZ & CAROL L. CHOMSKY, CONTRACTS: A CONTEMPORARY
APPROACH 793 (2010) (noting that substantial performance triggers the aggrieved
party’s promise to pay, less damages as the result of breach, while the aggrieved
party’s promise to pay does not arise if there is a material breach). See also 11
ARTHUR L. CORBIN ET AL., CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 55.6 (Joseph M. Perillo ed.,
Matthew Bender 2011) (discussing the difference between damages and
restitution).
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claim is regarded as substantial by the Minnesota Supreme Court.
How is the value in the contract dispute different from the value in
the takings dispute?
To use an example from popular culture, when someone is
searching the Internet for reviews of a recent theatrical release, it is
218
219
crucial to know out of how many possible stars or thumbs a
movie is rated. The Internet Movie Database allows users to rate
films they have seen using a scale of one to ten stars, with ten being
220
The tabloid magazine People also reviews films and
the highest.
rates them using stars, but four stars is the highest honor a movie
221
can earn. A film recommended by both the late Gene Siskel and
222
Roger Ebert would earn two thumbs up. Knowing a film received
a two, then, is meaningless unless it is clear into which system the
two is placed. A two from the Internet Movie Database, where the
movie earned only a fifth of the total stars potentially awarded,
might lead a person to skip the film altogether. A People review of
two, however, where a film took home half of its star potential,
might warrant a rental fee once the film is available for home
viewing. Two thumbs up, though, could be enough of an
endorsement to induce a movie buff to swallow the ticket price for
a first-run theater experience at the soonest available moment. Just
as two in this example means little beyond abstract theoretical
concepts, so does $170,000 without any context.
Comparing the 2006 jury award to the 1989 purchase price in
order to support the assertion that the diminution in value was
substantial is nonsensical. Such analysis does not take inflation of
223
the purchase price into account, nor does it reflect the increase
218. This is the rating symbol used by the Internet Movie Database. THE
INTERNET MOVIE DATABASE, http://imdb.com (last visited Sept. 18, 2011).
219. This was the rating symbol formerly used by movie critics Gene Siskel and
Roger Ebert. Joel Sternberg, Siskel and Ebert, THE MUSEUM OF BROADCAST COMM.,
http://www.museum.tv/eotvsection.php?entrycode=siskelandeb (last visited Sept.
18, 2011).
220. E.g., Transformers: Dark of the Moon User Ratings, THE INTERNET MOVIE
DATABASE, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt1399103/ratings (last visited Sept. 18,
2011).
221. E.g., Alynda Wheat, Harry Potter and the Deathly Hallows: Part 2: People
Critic’s Review, PEOPLE (July 15, 2011, 6:30 AM), http://www.people.com/people
/article/0,,20509509,00.html.
222. See supra note 219.
223. The 1989 purchase price of $159,600 had the buying power of
$277,115.80 in 2008, when the jury’s award was announced. CPI Inflation
Calculator, BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl (last
visited Sept. 18, 2011). This is more than $100,000 greater than the jury award.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2011

29

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 1 [2011], Art. 1

556

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:1

in value that accrued to the property during the seventeen years
between when the DeCooks purchased it and when they filed
224
This author fails to see how the relationship between these
suit.
two values has any bearing on whether or not a taking has
occurred.
It is possible that the Minnesota Supreme Court was not
persuaded by the diminution in value argument because it
considers such a measure to be part of the Penn Central test, with its
spawn of subsequent litigation, and not a key element of the
225
While the court leaves the door open to such an
McShane rule.
226
argument, it does not specify when it might be persuasive.
C. Potential Impact
Aside from offering little guidance to landowners and local
zoning officials as to what makes a diminution in value substantial
enough to constitute a taking, the DeCook decision is likely to have a
227
cooling effect on other municipal airports within the state and on
228
regulation of the Minneapolis-Saint Paul International Airport.
The rule does “not end airport zoning, but it would constantly push
zoning authorities to discount safety and efficiency in favor of
unrestricted use by landowners by making their interests the one
229
In this instance,
thing that cannot be balanced, only bought.”
the Board is, at the time of this writing, in the process of repealing
224. The pre-damage value of the property was $4.8 million by the DeCooks’
estimate and $2.77 million by the Board’s. DeCook v. Rochester Int’l Airport Joint
Zoning Bd., 796 N.W.2d 299, 304 (Minn. 2011).
225. Interview with Bradley Gunn, supra note 191.
226. DeCook, 796 N.W.2d at 308; see supra note 216.
227. See, e.g., Jeanne Schram, Residents Express Concern About Airport Zoning
Ordinance, AITKIN INDEPENDENT AGE (Mar. 23, 2011, 1:00 PM),
http://www.aitkinage.com/news/item/6118-residents-express-concern-aboutairport-zoning-ordinance (discussing the third public hearing regarding Aitkin
Airport zoning changes and emphasizing the several objections by local citizens).
228. The Metropolitan Airports Commission was one of five parties to file
amicus curiae briefs with the court. DeCook, 796 N.W.2d at 301. Local officials are
also worried: “For the Rochester International Airport, any future expansion
project that causes nearly any reduction in property value for adjacent property
owners will have to be re-examined in order to determine the ‘takings’ cost to the
City.” Michael Wojcik, City Loses Airport Lawsuit, VOTEWOJCIK.ORG (Mar. 30, 2011),
http://www.votewojcik.org/?p=1075 (citing Letter from Terry Adkins, City Att’y,
Rochester, to Michael Wojcik, Councilman, Rochester City Council (date
unspecified) (on file with Michael Wojcik)). Mr. Adkins is also concerned about
the effect the ruling will have on the Metropolitan Airports Commission. Id.
229. Brief for Metropolitan Airports Commission as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Appellant at 9, DeCook, 796 N.W.2d 299 (No. A09-969).
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the ordinance rather than compensating the DeCooks for the jury’s
230
award.
With only a new rule and the “$170,000 is substantial”
guideline to go by, airports may rethink any modification of their
zoning ordinances for fear of litigation or the fiscal impossibility of
compensating every adjacent landowner for a deprivation of
231
property rights which may be more theoretical than actual. Such
a result could impede implementation of the safest and most
232
current aviation technology and potentially impact the local and
regional economy if carriers can no longer utilize airports as
effectively because those airports do not support current
technology.
V. CONCLUSION
After adopting the McShane standard for airport zoning
regulation takings claims and rejecting the Board’s percent
diminution in value as a measure for determining whether a
reduction in market value is significant, the Minnesota Supreme
Court has left communities throughout the state without a means
of accurately determining whether their current or potential
airport regulations effect takings. While advocates for a rigid
system of private property may cheer in this particular instance, the
resulting uncertainty of the decision is far from beneficial and only
233
waters of takings
further muddles the already murky
jurisprudence.
A defendant’s best argument in an inverse
condemnation action now is not the presentation of a de minimis
percent diminution in value of the property in question but the
230. Answer Man, No Payments Made to Plaintiffs in Zoning Case, ROCHESTER
POST-BULLETIN, Apr. 14, 2011, at A2. If the Board is successful, the DeCooks will
likely seek to recover damages for the temporary taking of their land from the
time of the ordinance’s enactment through its repeal. Interview with Bradley
Gunn, supra note 191.
231. It is unclear what harm was actually done to the development potential of
the DeCooks’ property, as the DeCooks had not submitted any development plans
to the Board. Defendant’s Summary Judgment Motion, supra note 131, at 9. As
the Board points out, much of the land impacted by Zone A is a ravine visible in
aerial photographs of the property. Brief for Appellant at 5 DeCook, 796 N.W.2d
299 (No. A09-969) (pointing out that the land contains “dense trees, moderate to
steep slopes, and a drainage way”).
232. See Defendant’s Summary Judgment Motion, supra note 131, at 7, 26, 33.
Enabling technological innovation was the impetus behind Ordinance No. 4.
Brief for Appellant at 5 DeCook, 796 N.W.2d 299 (No. A09-969).
233. SKOURAS, supra note 2, at 30.
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hope that the presiding judge will not consider the damages award
especially large relative to her salary.
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